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The Incapacity of a Married W oman to be Next 
Friend or Guardian Ad Litem
Even today, the emancipation of women is far from complete in 
parts of Canada. Some Courts still appear to be zealous in upholding 
ancient restrictions placed upon married women. In Ontario the olcl 
rule continues that a married woman cannot act as a next friend or 
guardian ad litem for infant parties to litigation.1 An attempt to de­
termine the reason for its continuance may be of interest. There arc 
two possible explanations. The first is that the rule preventing a 
married woman from so acting is a rule of the common law. If so, 
it must be conceded that legislation is required before the Courts can 
allow a married woman to act as a guardian or next friend. If, however, 
the rule is not derived from the common law, then it must be mcrelv 
one of practice adopted bv the Courts. If so, the only reason for its 
present observance is the failure of the Courts to change their practice 
to conform to modern needs. It appears that the latter is tlic true 
reason.
The leading case is Re Duke of Somerset- where the Court refused 
to allow a married woman to be appointed a next friend. Chittv I. 
stated:
It was the established p ractice  th at a m arried  w om an could not fill the  
office of next friend o r  gu ard ian  ad litem , and the rule app ears to be 
founded on the in com p etence of a m arried  wom an to sue and be sued, 
and to be answ erable in costs.
1 lie decision of the Court was based on five points:
(1) It was the established practice that a married woman could 
not act as a next friend or guardian ad litem.
(2) That practice was founded on the incompetency of the mar­
ried woman to sue and be sued and to be answerable in costs.
(3) The Married W om an’s Property Act has not made a mar­
ried woman a femme sole for all purposes.
(4) The rules provide for the former practice.
(5) T o  grant the application would be a dangerous innovation 
because (a) a married woman is not responsible for costs or (b) is 
liable for costs only to the extent of her own property. It is to be 
noted that the learned Judge stated that it was a rule of practice.
The New Brunswick Court made a similar ruling when Barker J.
stated:
It is not the p ractice  of th e C ou rt to  app oin t a m arried  w om an as sole 
g u ard ian .3
1. Pe te rs o n  v. Pe te rson  (19521 3 D .L .R . 239 I O nt. H. C . l
2. In  re Duke of Som e rse t ;  T h y n n e  v. St. Maur <1887), 34 Ch. D. 465.
3. Re Gladys J u l i a  F r e e te  < 1905>. 3 N. B . Eq. 172.
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Further support for the argument that the rule is one of practice is the 
ease of Mastin v. Mastin' where Armour C. }. said:
I lie established p ia n ir c  is dial a m arried  wom an cann ot fill the office  
of nexI ftiend or gu ard ian  ad litem  because she cann ot be answ erable in
i  '» S i  S .
I lie fact that a married woman did act as guardian or next friend did 
not render the action void; it was a mere irregularity which could be 
cured.*’ This would seem confirmatory of the proposition that the rule 
was one of practice, not a common law prohibition.
In England the Judges have taken more progressive steps than 
have been taken in Canadian Courts. In January 1923, the Judges of 
the Chancery Division stated that there were certain exceptions to the 
general rule, and in December 1923, they gave further notice that there 
were special cases in which married women might act as guardians or 
next friends.0 Finally, without reference to, and without having to 
decide whether the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1935,7 
made anv change in this aspect of the law, a new rule of Court was made 
in 1947 as follows:
C). 16, r. 17A: Nothing in Rule 16 or 17 of this Order shall prevent 
a married woman acting as next friend or guardian.
It is of interest to note two recent decisions concerning the effect 
of the Married W oman’s Property Act. In Ontario it was held that 
the Act gave a married woman the capacity to contract. Accordingly 
she could be found guiltv of conspiracy with her husband because con­
spiracy involved contract.8 In Nova Scotia an opposite view was taken 
when the Court held that the Act did not change the status of a mar­
ried woman sufficiently to allow her husband to sue her to recover 
funds which he had entrusted to her care, and which she had fraudulent­
ly disposed of.0 If the main reason a married woman was not allowed 
to act as guardian or next friend was that she was not answerable in costs, 
it is suggested that the accepting of the office of guardian or next friend 
could d c  considered a form of contract, and having entered into such 
contract, the married woman would be bound bv the result of the action.
If a contract cannot be established it is submitted that in some 
provinces at least, the statutory provision that
A m arried  wom an shall be subject to the enforcem ent of ju dgm ents and  
orders and be capable of actin g  in any fiduciary o r represen tative c a p a ­
city 10
4. (18931. 15 P .R . 177. a t p. 179.
5. Re. Duke of Som erse t  <1887), 34 Ch. D. 465; D rin k w ater  v. National  Sand Co. [1938]
1 D .L .R . 799 (O nt. S .C .I ; Wainburgh v. Toron to  Board of Education (1914 ', 7 O .W .N .
396; Mastin v. Mastin 41893•. 15 P . R. 177.
6. W hite B o o k , Annual  Pract ice ,  1925, 249.
7. 25 & 26 G eo. V . c. 30.
8. R e t i n a  v. K o w bel l  [1953 ] 3 D .L .R  809.
9. G rov e v. Lively  11953] 3 D .L .R .  522.
10. M arried  W om an's P ro p erty  A ct, R .S .N .B ., 1952, c . 140. s. 2 (e ' & if* .
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should be sufficient to overcome the objection that she is immune 
from costs. An order for payment of costs would be an order of the 
Court and the married woman would be bound by the Court’s order 
oncc she had submitted to its jurisdiction by acccpting the office.
In any event, it is suggested that under modern conditions there is 
no reason why a married woman should not be allowed to act as next 
friend or guardian. If the Courts are reluctant to take upon themselves 
the task or removing the archaic rule, then the Legislatures should do so.
Eric L. Teed,
Saint John, N. B.
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